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Recent studies have found disapproval of peer punishment of norm violations. This 
seems puzzling, given the potential benefits peer punishers contribute to the group. We 
suggest part of the answer is that peer punishers tend to come across as aggressive and as such 
may be viewed as more problematic than beneficial to have around. We used simple computer 
animations of geometric shapes to enact 15 precise variations of social sanctions against a 
norm violator. More than 1,800 subjects were recruited to watch an animation and judge the 
behavior and character of the animated agents. They also completed a trait aggression 
measure. Across the variations peer punishment was typically disapproved of, especially 
when severe or openly aggressive, and especially by subjects low on trait aggression. We 
conclude that there seems to be a social norm against peer punishment and that dislike of 
aggressiveness seems to be part of the reason why. 
 
 





Consider a group of peers. One group member, Viola, violates a social norm. Another 
group member, Punisha, reacts WR9LROD¶VQRUPYLRODWLRQby some kind of informal 
punisKPHQW2WKHUJURXSPHPEHUVDOVRWHQGWRGLVDSSURYHRI9LROD¶VEHKDYLRU7KHTXHVWLRQ
is, will they therefore approve of Punisha punishing Viola?  
This question is motivated by the literature on cooperation in situations where there is a 
conflict between self-interest and group-interest. ,QVXFK³VRFLDOGLOHPPDV´HFRQRPLF
experiments demonstrate that groups may achieve substantially higher levels of cooperation if 
it is in the power of group members to punish each other (e.g., Yamagishi, 1986; Fehr & 
Gächter, 2000; Balliet, Mulder, & Van Lange, 2011). In this research tradition it is common 
to regard informal punishment of selfish behavior as a public good in itself. Consequently, 
those who do not punish free-riders among their peers are regarded as free-ULGLQJRQRWKHUV¶
punishment efforts. Because of the great potential benefits from cooperation it has been 
argued that biological and cultural evolutionary processes will shape social behavior such that 
all free-riding, including not punishing free-riders, is subject to peer punishment (e.g., 
Henrich & Boyd 2001). From this popular hypothesis it follows that other group members 
should definitely tend to approve of Punisha in the above scenario. Indeed, had Punisha not 
subjected Viola to punishment, we should expect other peers to want to punish both Viola for 
violating the norm and Punisha for not punishing Viola. 
Some experiments on economic games have addressed this prediction by letting 
participants react to peer punishment, either by participating in a second stage of sanctions 
(e.g., Cinyabuguma et al., 2006; Kiyonari & Barclay, 2008) or by expressing who they would 
prefer to be partnered with in subsequent games (Horita, 2010). Findings from such studies 
were reviewed by Strimling and Eriksson (2014), who concluded that the prediction is 
generally not supported by the data. Reactions to use of peer punishment in economic games 
actually tend to be negative. However, there is general concern about the external validity of 
economic laboratory games (Levitt & List, 2007). In particular, economic experiments on 
peer punishment implement it in terms of reducing the monetary payoff of another participant. 
Such material sanctions between peers are arguably uncommon in most real-life situations. 
The social psychological literature on informal sanctions between peers instead focuses on 
social forms of sanctions. For instance, in a field experiment where confederates violated 
various prosocial norms, researchers categorized informal sanctions as angry looks, loud 
audible sighs, loud comments to oneself, and comments to the norm violator ranging from 
polite to aggressive personal insults (Brauer & Chekroun, 2005). Unfortunately, such field 
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experiments tend not to study how people (other than the norm violator) react to such social 
sanctions.  
Thus, there is very limited research on how peer punishment of norm violators is 
viewed in real life. Recently this question has been approached using cross-cultural online 
surveys (Eriksson, Strimling & Ehn, 2013; Strimling & Eriksson, 2014). Consistent with the 
findings in economic games, survey respondents tended to disapprove of peer punishers. This 
finding held across cultures and across a range of situations. Strimling and Eriksson (2014) 
drew the conclusion that use of informal punishment between peers tend to be socially 
proscribed rather than prescribed. This poses a theoretical puzzle. Why is peer punishment 
disapproved of, despite its potential to solve the problem of achieving cooperation with all the 
benefits that entails? Below we develop a hypothesis to explain this puzzle. 
 
Is peer punishment condemned as aggression? 
In their most important study about peer punishment, Strimling and Eriksson (2014, 
Study 3) used four scenarios describing how one person acted against the interests of others in 
the group. Every scenario described a non-punisher and a peer punisher. Whereas the former 
was described as simply letting the selfish behavior go, the latter yelled about the selfish 
behavior (in three scenarios) or used a monetary punishment (in a scenario describing an 
economic experiment). Respondents from United States and India compared the two peers on 
seven traits. Results were consistent across all scenarios (including both yelling and monetary 
punishment) and both countries: Compared to the non-punisher, the peer punisher was judged 
as less preferable to spend time with; less likely to adhere to standard norms of behavior, less 
likely to take others' interests into account, and less likely to be trustworthy; but more likely 
to punish other people unfairly, more likely to be an angry person, and more likely to create 
bad morale in the group.  
Our interpretation is that use of peer punishment may be taken as a sign that the 
punisher has an angry disposition and GRHVQRWKDYHWKHJURXS¶VLQWHUHVWLQPLQGVarious 
results from previous studies are consistent with this interpretation. Use of peer punishment in 
economic lab experiments seems generally not motivated by the group outcome (Eriksson, 
Cownden, Ehn & Strimling, 2014). Experiments on the ultimatum game indicate that 
rejections of low offers, which is often conceived of as a form of peer punishment, is related 
to high testosterone levels (Burnham, 2007) and motives of assertion (Yamagishi et al., 2012). 
Field studies indicate that punishment between peers is often driven by hostile emotions 
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(Chaurand & Brauer, 2008). Thus, a tendency to judge peer punishers as angry and not having 
WKHJURXS¶VLQWHUHVWLQPLQGPD\EHZHOO-motivated.  
Note that disapproval of peer punishment is still puzzling from a rational point of view. 
After all, even if the punisher is motivated by anger rather than the good of the group, the 
group could still benefit from having a member who is prepared to punish any peers that 
behave selfishly. 
We think the puzzle dissolves of one takes into account the bigger picture of all 
situations that occur in a group. An angry group member may well be valuable in a particular 
situation and still be a problem in other situations where the anger is not aligned with the 
interest of the group. Indeed, it has recently been argued that bullies have been a major 
problem for groups to deal with in human evolutionary time (Sterelny, 2014). In line with this 
notion, a long-term trend towards ever stronger norms against physical aggression has been 
documented (Pinker, 2011). Even aggression towards an outgroup member is not particularly 
popular (Vandello, Ransom, Hettinger, & Askew, 2009). Several studies have found that a 
desire to punish someone tends not to be considered a good justification for aggression 
(Lagerspetz & Westman,1980; Ramirez, 1991). 
Our main hypothesis is that if a peer punisher comes across as aggressive then it does 
not help that the aggression is directed towards a behavior that everyone disapproves of. The 
positive aspect of the fact that a bad behavior was punished will tend to be trumped by the 
negative impression of perceived aggressiveness. 
 
Research questions about judgments of peer punishers and the act of peer punishment 
The main hypothesis motivates a number of questions. The first question asks what is 
included in the negative impression created by use of aggressive peer punishment. As 
described above, previous research suggests that when someone yells at a norm violator, or 
uses monetary punishment, it tends to be taken as an indication that the peer punisher has a 
number of undesirable traits (Strimling & Eriksson, 2014). Because the act of punishing may 
be beneficial to the group, it could be argued that even if people are wary of the person who 
performs an act of punishment it may still be viewed as appropriate and the punisher may still 
be viewed as an asset to the group. Thus, we are interested in establishing whether the 
negative impression of peer punishers extends to the act of punishment being viewed as 
inappropriate and the peer punisher being viewed as a problem to the group rather than an 
asset. The effect we expect is that SHRSOH¶VJHQHUDOGLVDSSURYDORISHHUSXQLVKPHQWZLOO
manifest in all these aspects. 
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 The main effect that peer punishment leads to general disapproval may be moderated 
by several factors. One factor is the characteristics of the individual that makes the judgment. 
It is known that approval of aggressive behavior is linked to own level of aggression 
(Huesmann & Guerra, 1997). From the main hypothesis that peer punishers tend to be viewed 
negatively because they come across as aggressive, we therefore expect less disapproval of 
peer punishers among people whose own level of aggression is high. 
Other factors relate to variations in the way the punishment is carried out. For instance, 
a punisher may act alone or have backing from less active supporters. When a punisher has 
supporters they should come across as less aggressive than the actual punisher. They are 
therefore expected to be less negatively evaluated. However it is unclear whether the 
evaluation of the actual punisher should depend on whether he or she is acting alone or with 
backing from supporters. On the one hand, the presence of supporters may make the 
punishment seem more in line with social norms. On the other hand, the presence of 
supporters may give the impression of a group ganging up on a lonely victim. 
Punishments may also vary in their severity. Game theoretic accounts of punishment 
assume that the more severe they are, the better they will serve the group as deterrents of 
future bad behavior (e.g., Becker, 1968). From that point of view, more severe punishments 
should gain higher approval. On the other hand, more severe punishment should come across 
as more aggressive. Based on the hypothesis that perceived aggressiveness trumps the 
potential benefits of punishment, we expect more severe punishment of a peer to lead to more 
negative judgments of the punisher. 
There are also different kinds of punishment. The above-mentioned economic 
laboratory games use an economic kind of peer punishment, such that WKHSXQLVKHGSDUW\¶s 
monetary payoff is reduced. Experiments on aggressive behavior in social psychology have 
often used physical kinds of peer punishment, such as administration of hot sauce, sound 
blasts, or electric shocks. Whether an economic or physical kind of punishment will be felt as 
the most severe by the punished party is likely to be subjective. However, we expect 
economic punishments to be generally perceived as less aggressive than physical 
punishments. The main hypothesis then predicts that an economic peer punisher will tend to 
be judged less negatively than a physical peer punisher. 
In real life it is common that reactions to a norm violation are neither economic nor 
physical, but rather take the form of a simple verbal confrontation. As a verbal confrontation 
may serve to establish a norm without causing any harm it should be regarded as more 
appropriate than economic or physical punishments and the verbal punisher should be less 
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likely to be viewed as a problem for the group. However, verbal confrontations still tend to be 
driven by hostile emotions (Chaurand & Brauer, 2008) and may therefore come across as 
aggressive. Indeed, the results from the yelling scenarios of Strimling and Eriksson (2014) 
indicate that also verbal punishers may be evaluated negatively.  
 
Outline of studies 
To obtain stimulus material representing a norm violation and different reactions to the 
norm violation, we constructed abstract animations of a group of geometric shapes. A classic 
finding in psychological research is that certain patterns of movements of abstract shapes are 
perceived as having social and emotional content (Heider & Simmel, 1944; Rimé et al., 
1985). Such animations have later been used with success in studies of social attribution (Bell, 
Fiszdon, Greig, Wexler, 2010; Castelli, Happé, Frith, Frith, 2000; Congiu, Schlottmann, Ray, 
2009; Klin, 2000). In a novel application of the technique of geometric animations, we here 
use it to study social judgment. Note that the most closely related previous research on social 
judgment of peer punishers used vignettes specifying people in a certain real-world context 
(Strimling & Eriksson, 2014). Geometric animations provide a simple way to enact a large set 
of precise variations of a peer punishment scenario. Because animations do not rely on verbal 
descriptions but on direct viewing, we expect them to be more salient than vignettes and less 
VXEMHFWWR³UHDGLQJEHWZHHQWKHOLQHV´)XUWKHUWKH\FDQEHXVHGDFURVVFXOWXUHVZLWKRXW
translation. 
Four studies were conducted. In every study, participants viewed animations and made 
social judgments of the animated agents. 3DUWLFLSDQWV¶ level of trait aggression was also 
measured. The first two studies (with American and Swedish participants, respectively) used 
scenarios with physical punishment of varying severity and it also varied whether the punisher 
acted alone or had supporters. In a control scenario there was no peer punishment at all. The 
third study examined economic punishment in the same manner. The last study examined 
verbal confrontation in the same manner and also tied up some loose ends from the previous 
studies. 
We report for each study how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions (if 
any), all manipulations, and all measures. 
 
Study 1: Physical sanctions 
In the first study we investigated $PHULFDQSDUWLFLSDQWV¶ reactions to physical sanctions 





All studies employed animations of geometric shapes to represent behavioral variations 
in a scenario about sharing of a common resource. The animations can be accessed at 
www.pontusstrimling.com/animations/  
In dramatic terms the basic scenario can roughly be divided into three scenes: The first 
scene establishes a norm: agents take turns to harvest a common resource. In the second 
scene, one of the agents violates this norm of turn-taking by harvesting the entire remaining 
resource. The third scene shows how the other agents acted to sanction the norm violation 
which varied depending on the condition.  
Specifically, the animation had the following building blocks (with the intended 
interpretation presented within parentheses): a white stage on which the action takes place; 
four triangles (the agents) of different colors, initially positioned in quadratic structures at 
each of the four corners of the stage; and a number of small circles (resource units), initially 
aggregated in the center. As the animation started each triangle moved, one by one, to the 
center to move one circle from there to their respective corner (harvesting the common 
resource). Figure 1 illustrates the overall features of the animations, the positioning of the 
triangles, and shows the blue triangle returning to its corner with a newly harvested circle.  
During the first scene each triangle went twice to the center to harvest a circle, increasing the 
number of circles at their respective corners while decreasing the number of circles at the 
center. At this point the purple triangle approached the center, first turning to the left and to 
the right (sneaking and looking around), and then proceeding to push all the remaining circles 
back to its corner. This concluded the norm violation scene. From this point onwards there 




Sanctions could be either collective, individual, or absent. In the collective sanction type 
of variation the green triangle moved to the center and turned around (looking for the circles). 
It then moved first to the pink triangle and then to the blue triangle (urging them to come), 
who both followed it back to the center. At the center they turned back and forth to each other 
(looking around and discussing the situation) before they together moved to the norm 
YLRODWRU¶VFRUQHUThey gathered outside this corner (seeing the stolen resources there) before 
turning away and forming a semi-circle in which they turned back and forth to each other 
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(having a meeting). At this point one of several punishments followed, to be described in the 
studies. 
In the individual sanction type of variation, the green triangle moved to the center, 
turned around, and then returned back to its corner (letting the norm violation go). Following 
this, the blue triangle moved to the center, turned left and right (looking around), and then 
moved on its own to the corner of the purple triangle (confronting the norm violator). At this 
point followed one of several punishment conditions described below. 
The no sanction condition started identically as the individual sanctions, but instead of 
the blue triangle moving from the center to confront the norm violator it turned around and 
moved back to its own corner (letting the norm violation go), and the animation ended.  
Study 1 used a between-subjects design with 100 participants in each of five conditions: 
no sanction (NO), collective weak physical sanction (CWP), individual weak physical 
sanction (IWP), collective strong physical sanction (CSP), and individual strong physical 
sanction (ISP).  
In the collective sanctions (CWP and CSP) conditions, the green and pink triangles 
aligned and pointed at the third one, the blue triangle, with their tips (encouraging it to act as 
the punisher). They then moved to face the norm violator in its corner, where the blue 
triangle, now in the middle of the three, delivered the sanction. Following the sanction, the 
triangles all returned to their respective corners, and the animation ended. In the individual 
sanctions (IWP and ISP) conditions, the blue triangle was on its own when it moved to the 
corner and delivered the sanction.  
A weak physical sanction (CWP and IWP) was implemented by the blue triangle 
making two moves against the purple triangle (shoving it backwards) with no damage being 
done. A strong physical sanction (CSP and ISP) was implemented by the blue triangle 
attacking the purple triangle four times until it shattered (hurtful engagement).  
 
Participants 
Five hundred participants (43% female, age ranging from 17 to 76 years with median 31 
years) were recruited among American users of Amazon Mechanical Turk (mturk.com) to 
take part in an online experiment. Participation was rewarded by a fee of 1 US dollar. The 





Subjects were instructed that they were going to watch a short (1-2 minutes) animation 
of triangles and report how they felt about the behavior of the different triangles. Animations 
were shown as embedded YouTube movies, and subjects were instructed that they could 
replay them if they wished. All questions about the animation were given on the same screen, 
so subjects could watch the animation again if they felt they needed it to answer the questions. 
Subjects were told that triangles would be referred to by their color names. To eliminate any 
ambiguity, they were explicitly told which color name (Blue, Green, Pink, or Purple) referred 
to the triangle in which corner. 
Throughout most of the questionnaire, responses were given on a seven point Likert 
scale from 1=Strongly Disagree to 7=Strongly Agree.  Subjects rated each of the four 
WULDQJOHVRQWKHVDPHWKUHHLWHPVZKHWKHUWKHWULDQJOH¶VEHKDYLRUZDV appropriate; whether 
they would like to spend time with a person who behaves like that triangle; and whether they 
would consider a person who belonged to their group and behaved like that triangle to be a 
problem (rather than an asset) for the group. 
7KUHHLWHPVGHDOWZLWKVXEMHFWV¶H[SHULHQce of rating the animations: whether they were 
confident they had judged the correct triangles; whether triangles had looked as if they were 
³DOLYH´DQGZKHWKHUWKHWULDQJOHV¶PRWLRQORRNHGas if it was goal-directed and intentional. 
Five additional items focused on the blue triangle, asking for subjectV¶spontaneous 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHEOXHWULDQJOH¶V character. All items started I think BLUE is someone 
who..., and then continued: is generally trustworthy; is generally angry; takes others' interests 
into account; would punish others unfairly; and generally follows standard norms of 
behavior. These items were adapted from a previous study of punishers (Strimling & 
Eriksson, 2014). The response scale was ³QR´³GRQ¶WNQRZ´DQG³\HV´FRGHGDVDQG. 
Subjects were then asked how many times they had watched the animation and given 
the opportunity to motivate their judgments of the animation in free text. They then completed 
a short Trait Aggression scale (Bryant & Smith, 2001). Although not reported below, the 
study also included a short Big Five scale (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003) and either a 








Validity of animations 
Before addressing our research questions we analyzed the validity of the animations as a 
method to elicit social judgments of norm violations and sanctions. Subjects were confident 
they had judged the correct triangles (median response 7 out of 7). They also thought the 
triangles looked alive (median response 6 out of 7) and that their movement was goal-directed 
and intentional (median response 7 out of 7). PurpleWKH³QRUPYLRODWRU´ was typically rated 
as being a problem for the group (median response 7 out of 7) and not behaving appropriately 
(median response 1 RXWRI7KXVDVGHVLUHG3XUSOH¶VDFWLRQZDVSHUFHLYHG as a clear norm 
violation.  
Most subjects (81%) wrote a motivation of their judgments, and these motivations 
W\SLFDOO\LQGLFDWHGYLYLGLPSUHVVLRQVRIWULDQJOHV¶LQWHQWLRQVHPRWLRQVDQGPRUDOLW\. Here are 
two random examples of motivations given in different conditions: 
³I think Blue has a group's best interests at heart, and I think he stands for fairness and is 
willing to fight for equality. Green and Pink, it seems like they want equality, but rather 
have someone fight on their behalf rather than stand up for their own selves and fight for it. 
It seems to me that they talked Blue into fighting the Purple triangle who was completely 
out of line for stealing all the red balls´&:P) 
³%OXHKDGVRPHVHULRXVDQJHULVVXHV3XUSOHWRRNZD\WRRPDQ\GRWV3LQNDQGJUHHQ
SOD\HGIDLUO\´,6P) 
In sum, we conclude that animations of geometric shapes seem to be a valid way of 
tapping LQWRSHRSOH¶VVRFLDOMXGJPents.  
 
Judgments of the peer punisher 
Subjects made a total of eight judgments of Blue, the triangle that was the active 
punisher in all conditions involving peer punishment. Table 1 presents mean values for each 
item in each condition.  
  A factor analysis strongly supported a single factor explaining 64% of the variance, on 
which the five positive items loaded positively and the three negative items (i.e., is a problem 
for the group, is generally angry, and would punish others unfairly) loaded negatively. After 
reverse-coding the latter three items a z-score transformation was performed for each item. 
The average of the eight z-scores will be referred to as the Blue approval index &URQEDFK¶V




Approval of non-punishment vs. peer punishment  
The results in Table 1 indicate a robust difference in Blue approval between non-
punishment and peer punishment: On every single item, Blue gained higher mean approval in 
the no sanction condition than in any of the peer punishment conditions. The effect size was 
generally very large; the difference in Blue approval between the no sanction condition (M = 
0.79) and the pooled peer punishment conditions (M = -0.20) UHSUHVHQWVD&RKHQ¶Vd of 1.24.   
 
Moderating effects of support and severity on approval of peer punishment 
Now consider how the Blue approval index varied within the set of peer punishment 
conditions. These conditions followed a two-by-two design: two levels of punishment severity 
(weak, strong) and two levels of support of the punisher (individual, collective). A two-way 
analysis of variance yielded a large main effect of severity, F(1, 396) =99.93, p < .001, such 
that the average approval was lower for strong punishment (M = -0.53, SD = 0.63) than for 
weak punishment (M = 0.13, SD = 0.71), d = 0.89. There was also a small main effect of 
support for the punisher, F(1, 396) = 8.24, p = .004, such that approval was lower for 
individual punishment (M = -0.29, SD = 0.75) than for collective punishment (M = -0.10, SD 
= 0.75), d = 0.25. The interaction effect was non-significant, F(1, 396) = 0.09, p = .76. 
 
Ratings of other group members 
We now turn to ratings of the remaining group members, Green and Pink. Mean ratings 
on the three items that were asked about each of these triangles are reported in Table 1. After 
reverse-coding the problem-for-the-group item, a z-score transformation was performed for 
each item. The average of the six z-scores will be referred to as the Green-Pink approval 
index &URQEDFK¶VDOSKD ). Mean values of the Green-Pink approval index per condition 
can be found in Table 1.  
In a post hoc analysis, two things stand out as noteworthy. First, Green-Pink approval 
was higher in the no sanction condition (M = 0.33) than in any of the peer punishment 
conditions (pooled M = -0.08), d = 0.577KXVLWVHHPVWKDW%OXH¶VGHSOR\PHQt of peer 
punishment reflected badly also on the group as a whole. This is consistent with prior findings 
that people tend to make poorer judgments of a group if one of its members punishes a peer 
(Strimling & Eriksson, 2014, Study 4).  
Second, Green-Pink approval was particularly low in the collective strong punishment 





Trait aggression and approval of peer punishment relative to non-punishment 
Responses to the 12-LWHPWUDLWDJJUHVVLRQVFDOH&URQEDFK¶VDOSKD  were averaged 
to a TA score between 1 and 7 (M = 3.36, SD = 1.05). 7RPHDVXUHLQGLYLGXDOVXEMHFWV¶
approval of peer punishment relative to non-punishment we focused on the individual 
sanction conditions, where we computed the difference between the Blue approval index and 
the Green-Pink approval index. To examine whether UDWHUV¶OHYHORIWUDLWDJJUHVVLRQSUHGLFWed 
their approval of peer punishment relative to non-punishment, we calculated the correlation 
between the approval index difference and the TA score in these conditions. The correlation 
was positive both in the individual weak sanction condition (r = .28, p = .005, N = 100) and 
the individual strong sanction condition (r = .44, p < .001, N = 100). Thus, raters that scored 





A previous study (Strimling and Eriksson, 2014) presented respondents with verbal 
descriptions of scenarios where one peer reacted to a norm violation by letting it go and 
another peer reacted by punishing the norm violator. In that study, peer punishers were 
consistently judged as having a worse character than the non-punisher: less trustworthy, less 
OLNHO\WRWDNHRWKHUV¶LQWHUHVWVLQWRDFFRXQWHWF+HUHZHUHSOLFDWHGWKHVHILQGLQJVXVLQJ
animations of geometric shapes instead of verbal scenarios and using a between-subjects 
instead of within-subjects design. 
This study was designed to answer several additional research questions as well. First, 
we found that the disapproval of peer punishment seems to extend beyond judgments of the 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VFKDUDFWHUWRLQFOXGHYLHZLQJWKHLQGLYLGXDODVa problem for the group and the 
behavior as inappropriate. Second, we found disapproval of peer punishment to be moderated 
by several factors. TKHUDWHU¶VOHYHORItrait aggression predicted less disapproval of peer 
punishment relative to non-punishment. Further, more severe peer punishment tended to be 
disapproved of more. All of these findings are consistent with our hypothesis that disapproval 
of peer punishment is related to it being viewed as aggressive. 
We also compared a peer punisher acting alone with a peer punisher backed up by 
supporters. The presence of supporters made the peer punisher look somewhat better (but at 




Study 2: Replication of Study 1 under lab conditions 
Study 1 used an on-line sample recruited among American users of the Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. It is an important test of robustness to establish that the same findings are 
obtained also under other circumstances. We therefore replicated Study 1 in a Swedish 




An invitation to participate was sent by email to students at a Swedish university who 
had previously expressed interest in participating in experiments. 162 participants were 
recruited (45% female, 51% male, 3% unknown, age ranging from 18 to 74 years with median 
25 years). Participation in a session was rewarded by a show-up fee of 60 Swedish kronor 
(about 10 US dollars). Sessions included both this study and other unrelated studies for a total 
duration of about one hour. The sample size was set to be smaller than in Study 1 due to the 
higher cost of participation fees. 
 
Procedure 
Subjects showed up at the laboratory at the start of a session and were led to cubicles 
separated by screens. Every cubicle had a desk with a computer on which the experiment was 
run. The software randomly assigned subjects to one of the five conditions, the same as in 
Study 1, and presented subjects with the same battery of questions (in Swedish translation), 
including the Big 5 and Social Dominance Orientation scales that we do not report.   
 
Results 
The results of this study generally replicated the findings of Study 1, although 
statistically weaker because of the considerably smaller sample size. First we calculated the 
Blue approval index &URQEDFK¶VDOSKD Mean values per condition are reported in 
Table 2. The difference in Blue approval between the no sanction condition (M = 0.71) and 
the pooled peer punishment conditions (M = -UHSUHVHQWVD&RKHQ¶Vd of 1.18.   
A two-way analysis of variance revealed a large main effect of severity, F(1, 126) = 
24.89, p < .001, with average approval lower for strong punishment (M = -0.46, SD = 0.61) 
than for weak punishment (M = 0.10, SD = 0.66), d = 0.80. The main effect of support for the 
punisher was not statistically significant, F(1, 126) = 1.66, p = .20, but resembled Study 1 in 
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terms of effect size such that approval tended to be lower for individual punishment (M = -
0.24, SD = 0.69) than for collective punishment (M = -0.11, SD = 0.70), d = 0.20. The 
interaction effect was non-significant, F(1, 126) = 0.05, p = .82. 
Descriptive statistics of the Green-Pink approval index &URQEDFK¶VDOSKD ) are 
presented in Table 2. Just as in Study 1, approval was highest in the no sanction condition and 
lowest in the collective strong punishment condition.  
We then examined the WUDLWDJJUHVVLRQVFDOH&URQEDFK¶VDOSKD , M = 3.31, SD = 
0.75). In line with Study 1 the correlation between the TA score and the difference between 
the Blue and Green-Pink approval indexes was positive both in the individual weak sanction 
condition (r = .31, p = .07, N = 33) and the individual strong sanction condition (r = .40, p 
= .024, N = 31).  
 
Discussion  
The findings from the American on-line sample of Study 1 was replicated using the 
same animations but in a study conducted in a lab environment with Swedish students. It 
seems to be a general observation that findings tend to generalize across lab and on-line 
studies (e.g., Buhrmester, Kwang & Gosling, 2011; Paolacci, Chandler & Ipeirotis, 2010). It 
is more noteworthy that the findings generalized across the cultural gap between Americans 
and Swedes. This generalizability is consistent with previous findings of cross-cultural 
similarities in the view of informal punishment (Strimling & Eriksson, 2014). 
 
Study 3: Economic sanctions 
So far we have found that ³SK\VLFDO´VDQFWLRQVRIDQRUPYLRODWRU tend to be 
disapproved of. +HUHZHLQYHVWLJDWH³HFRQRPLF´VDQFWLRQVLQVWHDGLQterms of resources 




Five hundred participants (47% female, age ranging from 18 to 75 years with median 30 
years) were recruited among American users of Amazon Mechanical Turk (mturk.com) to 
take part in an online experiment. Participation was rewarded by a fee of 1 US dollar. The 





The experiment used a between-subjects design with 100 participants in each of five 
conditions: no sanction (NO), collective weak economic sanction (CWE), individual weak 
economic sanction (IWE), collective strong economic sanction (CSE), and individual strong 
economic sanction (ISE).  
In the collective sanctions (CWE and CSE) conditions, the three triangles moved 
together to the corner where the norm violator was located; each of them took the same 
QXPEHURIWKHQRUPYLRODWRU¶VFLUFOHVDQGWKHQUHWXUQHGWRWKHLUUHVSHFWLYHFRUQHUVDWZKLFK
point the animation ended). In the individual sanctions (IWE and ISE) conditions, the blue 
triangle was on its own and WRRNDQXPEHURIWKHQRUPYLRODWRU¶VFLUFOHVOHIWWZRWKLUGVLQWKH
center and brought the remaining third to its own corner (at which point the animation ended).  
A weak economic sanction (CWE and IWE) was implemented by the purple triangle, 
WKH³QRUPYLRODWRU´ being deprived only of the circles it had taken out of turn (leaving it with 
those resources that had been harvested according to the norm). A strong economic sanction 
was implemented by the purple triangle being deprived of all its circles (leaving the norm 
violator with no resources at all). 
 
Procedure 
The procedure followed Study 1 with one minor change:  For the five items focusing on 
VXEMHFWV¶VSRQWDQHRXVLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHEOXHWULDQJOH¶VFKDUDFWHUWKHUHVSRQVHVFDOHZDV
changed to the same 7-point Likert scale used throughout the rest of the questionnaire. 
Although not reported below, the study also included the same short Big Five scale and 
Justice-Vengeance Scale as Study 1. 
 
Results 
The analysis follows that of Study 1. As in Study 1 there was high agreement that the 
triangles looked alive (median response 6) and that their movement was goal-directed and 
intentional (median response 7).  
Descriptive statistics, per condition, for the Blue and Green-Pink approval indices 
&URQEDFK¶VDOSKD DQGUHVSHFWLYHO\are reported in Table 3. The difference in Blue 
approval between the no sanction condition (M = 0.45) and the pooled peer punishment 
conditions (M = -0.11UHSUHVHQWVD&RKHQ¶Vd of 0.75. This is a large effect but not as large as 
for the physical sanctions in Studies 1 and 2. 
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A two-way analysis of variance of Blue approval revealed a medium-sized main effect 
of severity, F(1, 396) = 23.55, p < .001, with average Blue approval lower for strong 
punishment (M = -0.29, SD = 0.81) than for weak punishment (M = 0.07, SD = 0.66), d = 
0.47. There was a small main effect of support for the punisher, F(1, 396) = 6.17, p = .013, 
such that approval tended to be lower for individual punishment (M = -0.20, SD = 0.83) than 
for collective punishment (M = -0.02, SD = 0.66), d = 0.24. The interaction effect was non-
significant, F(1, 396) = 0.01, p = .91. 
Also Green-Pink approval followed the same pattern as in Studies 1 and 2: Approval 
was highest in the no sanction condition and lowest in the collective strong punishment 
condition. 
We then examined the trait aggression scale (M = 3.39, SD = 0.98). The correlation 
between the TA score and the difference between the Blue and Green-Pink approval indexes 
showed a very weak and non-significant positive tendency in the individual weak sanction 
condition (r = .08, p = .41, N = 100) but was statistically significant in the individual strong 
sanction condition (r = .24, p = .017, N = 100). 
 
Discussion 
The results of this study indicate that the social norm against peer punishment is not 
restricted to physical sanctions. Also economic sanctions, in the form of taking back resources 
that a norm violator has taken out of turn from a common pool, received less approval than 
letting the norm violation go. We also replicated the other main findings from Studies 1 and 2: 
First, more severe punishment was less approved of. Second, collective punishment was more 
approved of than individual punishment. Third, when one group member punished a peer it 
reflected badly even on group members that were not involved in the punishment. Fourth, trait 
aggression was related to lower disapproval of peer punishment relative to non-punishment. 
Table 3 includes ratings of Blue on those items where the same response scale was used 
as in Study 1. A comparison between the absolute levels of ratings of Blue in Tables 1 and 3 
suggests that economic punishments were met with less disapproval than physical 
punishments. In particular it is noteworthy that the weak physical punishment (shoving Purple 
once with no damage being done) tended to be more disapproved of than strong economic 
punishment (depriving Purple of all its resources). Arguably, the latter punishment does more 
harm. This pattern is consistent with perceived aggression, rather than actual harm done, 
being the main driver of disapproval. 
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Study 4: More variations on sanctions 
One concern with the previous studies is that the individual sanction conditions all 
started with Green letting the norm violation go before Blue made the decision to punish. It is 
SRVVLEOHWKDW*UHHQ¶VEHKDYLRUHVWDEOLVKHGDQRUPRIQRQ-SXQLVKPHQWDQGWKDW%OXH¶VGHFLVLRQ
to punish would otherwise have been met with approval. In order to test this alternative 
H[SODQDWLRQRI%OXH¶VORZDSSURYDOUDWLQJVZe conducted a new study of individual sanctions 
in which Blue was always the first one to notice the norm violation. We made this adaption to 
three conditions from the earlier studies: no sanction, individual weak physical sanction, and 
individual strong economic sanction.   
Another concern with the economic sanctions in Study 3 is that Blue may have come 
across as selfish by keeping for itself a third of the resources taken from Purple. Thus 
disapproval might have been driven by the perception of selfishness rather than disapproval of 
the peer punishment itself. In order to test this alternative explanation we included a new 
version of individual strong economic sanction in which Blue left all the resources in the 
middle. 
Whereas physical and economic punishments are often used in lab experiments, we 
discussed in the introduction that real-life social sanctions may typically consist of verbal 
confrontations instead. To test the approval of verbal confrontations within our animation 
paradigm we adapted the weak physical punishment condition into a verbal condition by 
replacing the shove with a speech balloon containing an exclamation mark.  
Finally, it seems plausible that approval of peer punishment may depend on whether it 
works as an effective deterrent of the norm violation. We tested this by adding a condition in 
which the verbal confrontation was followed by Purple returning the ill-gotten resources to 




Six hundred and forty participants (48% female, age ranging from 18 to 73 years with 
median 30 years) were recruited among American users of Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(mturk.com) to take part in an online experiment. Participation was rewarded by a fee of 0.50 
US dollars. The sample size was set to match that of Studies 1 and 3, i.e., 100 subjects per 





The experiment used a between-subjects design with six conditions: no sanction (NO-
B), weak physical sanction (IWP-B), strong economic sanction (ISE-B), strong economic 
unselfish sanction (ISE-un), verbal sanction (IV), and verbal effective sanction (IVE). There 
were 100 subjects per condition with the exception of the no sanction condition, which was 
taken by 140 subjects. 
For this experiment the blue triangle, who also carried out the punishments, was the first 
and only triangle to move following the norm violation by purple triangle. The weak physical 
sanction (IWP-B) otherwise played out as previously (in Study 1 and 2), with the blue triangle 
making two moves against the purple triangle, with no damage being done, and then returning 
to its corner. 
Beside the blue triangle being the only triangle to act following the norm violation by 
purple, the strong economic sanction (ISE-B) also played out as previously (in Study 3) with 
EOXHWULDQJOHWDNLQJDOORIWKHQRUPYLRODWRU¶VFLUFOHVOHDYLQJWZRWKLUGVLQWhe center and 
bringing the remaining third into its own corner. In the strong economic unselfish sanction 
(ISE-un) all actions were identical except that the blue triangle now returned all the circles to 
the center and did not bring any to its own corner.  
The verbal sanctions (IV and IVE) mimicked the physical punishment condition (IWP-
B), but with no pushing. Instead, the blue triangle faced the purple triangle and wiggled 
rapidly side to side while a speech balloon appeared above it with a pulsating exclamation 
mark (talking). At this the purple triangle backed away slightly. The verbal sanction (IV) 
ended with the blue triangle returning to its corner. In the verbal effective sanction (IVE) the 
purple triangle then returned the circles to the middle, thus restoring the situation as it was 
before the norm transgression. 
 
Procedure 
The procedure followed Study 3 with the exception that the Big Five and Justice-








The effect of having Blue go first 
7KHILUVWFRQFHUQZDVZKHWKHU%OXH¶VGHFLVLRQWRSXQLVKZRXld have been met with 
approval if only Green had not established a norm of non-punishment. The present study 
indicates this is not the case: Both the weak physical and strong economic sanctions remained 
at considerably lower levels of approval than non-punishment, &RKHQ¶Vd = 1.31 and 0.92, 
respectively.  
 
Profitable vs. unselfish economic sanctions 
  The second concern was whether disapproval of economic sanctions was driven by 
their being profitable and therefore coming across as selfish. A comparison between 
conditions ISE-B and ISE-un shows that approval ratings rose considerably when Blue did not 
profit from the economic sanction, p &RKHQ¶Vd = 0.70. Indeed, although mean 
approval of the unselfish version of economic punishment was lower than for non-
punishment, the difference was small and did not quite reach statistical significance, p = .066, 
&RKHQ¶Vd = 0.25. 
 
Verbal sanctions 
Verbal sanction (IV) was less approved of than non-sanction, p &RKHQ¶Vd = 
0.46, and this held even when the verbal sanction was shown to be effective at changing the 
QRUPYLRODWRU¶VZD\V,9-E), p  &RKHQ¶Vd = 0.30. Indeed, there was no statistically 
significant improvement of approval of verbal sanction when it was shown to be effective, p 
 &RKHQ¶Vd = 0.16.  
 
Discussion 
As in the previous three studies, the no sanction condition yielded the highest level of 
Blue approval. There was a clear difference in approval between non-punishment and all peer 
punishment conditions with the exception of the unselfish economic punishment. Note that 
the latter kind of sanction was explicitly prosocial. Such explicitly prosocial sanctions are 
unlikely to be available in many real-life situations; it seems to be particular to scenarios 





The topic of this paper is how people view peer enforcement of social norms. In the 
introduction we reviewed recent empirical work suggesting that peer punishment tends not to 
be approved of. From a functional perspective this seemed puzzling as peer punishers can 
promote cooperation that benefits the group. We hypothesized that the answer to this puzzle is 
that peer punishers will often come across as aggressive, and that the impression of within-
group aggression is no negative that it outweighs the potential benefits to the group in the 
situation at hand. 
To examine this hypothesis we conducted a series of experiments where subjects rated 
animations showing a norm violation and various reactions to it. The target of peer 
punishment was a behavior that clearly harmed the group. Nonetheless, peer punishers tended 
to be viewed as behaving less appropriately than a non-punisher and as being more of a 
problem for the group. Several findings about moderators spoke to the role of perceived 
aggressiveness in driving disapproval of peer punishment. First, more aggressive raters tended 
to show less disapproval of peer punishment. Second, more severe punishments tended to be 
more disapproved of. Third, clearly aggressive but non-harmful punishment tended to be 
more disapproved of than clearly harmful but material punishment (Study 4).  
A limitation of our studies is that only one kind of norm violation was used. When one 
individual takes more than its share of a common resource it has negative consequences for 
everyone else in the group. Other norm violations may be neutral in their consequences for 
others, such as having sex with someone that society does not approve of your having sex 
with. Norm violations may even be objectively beneficial for everyone else in the group, such 
as giving more generously to a common cause than other group members are comfortable 
with (Parks & Stone, 2010). It is an intriguing question whether the view of peer punishment 
depends on what kind of norm violation it targets. This should be addressed in future research. 
We note that the animation technique employed in this paper could be used to enact other 
norm violations as well. 
Another limitation of our studies is that all sanctions were direct confrontations. 
Informal sanctions can also be non-confrontational, such as gossip and avoidance. Non-
confrontational sanctions are likely to come across as non-aggressive. Our hypothesis would 
therefore expect use of non-confrontational sanctions between peers to gain higher social 
approval. This could also straightforwardly be investigated using the same basic methodology 




To conclude, when someone violates a prosocial norm it seems to be counter-normative 
for a peer to react with confrontational punishment even though it may be good for the group. 
Dislike of aggressiveness seems to be part of the explanation why confrontational peer 
punishment is frowned upon. However, there are likely to be other contributing mechanisms 
as well. For instance, it seems very common that peer punishers experience counter-
punishment from their target (Balafoutas & Nikiforakis, 2012; Nikiforakis, 2008; Nugier et 
al., 2007). This experience could, we speculate, contribute to internalization of a norm that 
you should not punish your peers.  
A peer punisher should, it seems, expect to be met with counter-punishment as well as 
general disapproval. For some people and in some situations, these social costs may be 
outweighed by the emotional reward of acting out against someone whose behavior is 
unacceptable. The same kind of emotional reward might be attainable through consumption of 
popular stories of heroic vigilantes, like Robin Hood or Batman, punishing bad guys. Note, 
however, that such stories differ from our notion of peer punishment in two critical respects. 
First, the villains are usually not peers but extraordinarily evil and powerful. Second, the 
heroes are often mainly focused on preventing evil deeds, or setting them right, rather than 
punishing them. We would welcome research into how these aspects (the power of the norm 
violator and the difference between punishment and prevention) affect views of peer reactions 
to norm violations. 
Finally, note that people do not disapprove of punishment in general. Political parties 
that promise to enforce laws that punish wrongdoers tend to be popular. There is no popular 
demand for abolishing all punishment from the criminal code. In short, formal punishment is 
generally approved of. In those situations where punishment could play a positive role and 
formal punishment is not available, it would be desirable if peer punishment could gain 
general approval. If, as we hypothesize, a key issue with peer punishers is that they tend to 
come across as aggressive, then genuinely prosocial peer punishers should actively try to 
signal that they are calm and not driven by anger. This may be the most important direction of 
future research on peer punishment. 
 
Conflict of Interest Statement  






Balafoutas, L., & Nikiforakis, N. (2012). Norm enforcement in the city: a natural field 
experiment. European Economic Review, 56, 1773-1785. 
doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.09.008 
Balliet, D., Mulder, L.B. & Van Lange, P.A.M. (2011). Reward, punishment, and 
cooperation: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 137, 594-615. 
doi:10.1037/a0023489 
Becker, G. (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic approach. The Journal of Political 
Economy, 169, 176-177.  
Bell, M. D., Fiszdon, J. M., Greig, T. C., & Wexler, B. E. (2010). Social attribution test ± 
multiple choice (SAT-MC) in schizophrenia: Comparison with community sample and 
relationship to neurocognitive, social cognitive and symptom measures. Schizophrenia 
Research, 122, 164-171.  doi:10.1016/j.schres.2010.03.024 
Brauer, M., & Chekroun, P. (2005). The relationship between perceived violation of social 
norms and social control: Situational factors influencing the reaction to deviance. Journal 
of Applied Social Psychology, 35, 1519±1539. doi:10.1111/j.1559-1816.2005.tb02182.x 
%U\DQW)%	6PLWK%'5H¿QLQJWKHDUFKLWHFWXUHRIDJJUHVVLRQ$PHDVXUHPHQW
model for the Buss±Perry aggression questionnaire. Journal of Research in Personality, 
35, 138±167. doi:10.1006/jrpe.2000.2302 
Buhrmester, M. D., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. (2011). $PD]RQ¶V0HFKDQLFDO7Xrk: A new 
source of inexpensive, yet high-quality, data?. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6, 
3±5. doi: 10.1177/1745691610393980 
Burnham, T. C. (2007). High-testosterone men reject low ultimatum game offers. 
Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 274, 2327±2330. 
doi:10.1098/rspb.2007.0546 
Chaurand, N., & Brauer, M. (2008). What determines social control? People's reactions to 
counternormative behaviors in urban environments. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 
38, 1689-1715. doi: 10.1111/j.1559-1816.2008.00365.x 
Cinyabuguma, M., Page, T., & Putterman L. (2006). Can second-order punishment deter 
perverse punishment? Experimental Economics, 9, 265-279. doi:10.1007/s10683-006-
9127-z 
Eriksson, K., Strimling, P., & Ehn, M. (2013). Ubiquity and efficiency of restrictions on 




Eriksson, K., Cownden, D., Ehn, M., & Strimling, P. (2014). µ$OWUXLVWLF¶DQGµDQWLVRFLDO¶
punishers are one and the same. Review of Behavioral Economics, 3, 1±13. 
doi:10.1561/105.00000009 
Gosling, S. D., Rentfrow, P. J., & Swann, W. B., Jr. (2003). A very brief measure of the big 
five personality domains. Journal of Research in Personality, 37, 504-528. 
doi:10.1016/S0092-6566(03)00046-1 
Heider, F., & Simmel, M. (1944). An experimental study of apparent behavior. American 
Journal of Psychology, 57, 243-259. 
Henrich, J., & Boyd, R. (2001). Why people punish defectors: Weak conformist transmission 
can stabilize costly enforcement of norms in cooperative dilemmas. Journal of Theoretical 
Biology, 208, 79-89. doi:10.1006/jtbi.2000.2202 
Ho, R., ForsterLee, L., ForsterLee, R., & Crofts, N. (2002). Justice versus vengeance: Motives 
underlying punitive judgements. Personality and Individual Differences, 33, 365-377. 
doi:10.1016/S0191-8869(01)00161-1 
Horita, Y. (2010). Punishers may be chosen as providers but not as recipients. Letters on 
Evolutionary Behavioral Science. 1, 6²9. 
Huesmann, L. R., & Guerra, N. G. (1997). Children's normative beliefs about aggression and 
aggressive behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 408-419. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.72.2.408 
Kiyonari, T. and Barclay, P. (2008). Cooperation in social dilemmas: Free riding may be 
thwarted by second-order reward rather than by punishment. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 95, 826-842. doi:10.1037/a0011381 
Klin, A. (2000). Attributing social meaning to ambiguous visual stimuli in higher-functioning 
autism and asperger syndrome: the Social Attribution Task. Journal of Child Psychology 
and Psychiatry and Allied Disciplines, 41, 831-846. doi: 10.1111/1469-7610.00671 
Lagerspetz K., & Westman, M. (1980). Moral approval of aggressive acts. A preliminary 
investigation. Aggressive Behavior, 6, 119-130. doi:10.1002/1098-
2337(1980)6:2<119::AID-AB2480060203>3.0.CO;2-Y 
Levitt, S. D., & List, J. A. (2007). What do laboratory experiments measuring social 
preferences reveal about the real world?. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21, 153-
174. doi: 10.1257/jep.21.2.153 
Nikiforakis, N. (2008). Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games: Can we 




Nugier, A., Niedenthal, P. M., Brauer, M., & Chekroun, P. (2007). Moral and angry emotions 
provoked by informal social control. Cognition and Emotion, 21, 1699-1720. 
doi:10.1080/02699930601124738 
Paolacci, G., Chandler, J., & Ipeirotis, P.G. (2010). Running experiments on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. Judgment and Decision Making, 5, 411±419. 
Parks, C.D., & Stone, A.B. (2010) The desire to expel unselfish members from the group. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 99, 303-310. doi: 10.1037/a0018403 
Pinker, S. (2011). Decline of violence: Taming the devil within us. Nature, 478, 309-311. 
doi:10.1038/478309a 
Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L. M., & Malle, B. F. (1994). Social dominance 
orientation: A personality variable predicting social and political attitudes. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 741-763. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.67.4.741 
Ramirez, J. M. (1991). Similarities in attitudes toward interpersonal aggression in Finland, 
Poland, and Spain. The Journal of social psychology, 131(5), 737-739. doi: 
10.1080/00224545.1991.9924656 
Rimé, B., Boulanger, B., Laubin, P., Richir, M., & Stroobants, K. (1985). The perception of 
inter-personal emotions originated by patterns of movement. Motivation and Emotion, 9, 
241-260. doi: 10.1007/BF00991830 
Sterelny K. (2014). Cooperation, culture and conflict. British Journal of Philosophy of 
Science. Advance access, doi:10.1093/bjps/axu024. 
Strimling, P., & Eriksson, K. (2014). Regulating the regulation: Norms about how people may 
punish each other. In Van Lange P, Yamagishi T, & Rockenbach B (eds.) Social 
Dilemmas: Punishment and Rewards, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 52-69. 
Vandello, J. A., Ransom, S., Hettinger, V. E., & Askew, K. (2009). 0HQ¶VPLVSHUFHSWLRQV
about the acceptability and attractiveness of aggression. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 45, 1209-1219. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2009.08.006 
Yamagishi, T. (1986). The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 110-116. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.51.1.110 
Yamagishi, T., Horita, Y., Mifune, N., Hashimoto, H., Li, Y., Shinada, M., ... & Simunovic, 
D. (2012). Rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum game is no evidence of strong 






Table 1. Mean values per condition for measures in Study 1  
Item NO CWP IWP CSP ISP Total St Dev 
Blue is generally trustworthy 1.87 1.46 1.33 0.90 0.73 1.26 0.84 
Blue is generally angry* 1.77 0.96 0.65 0.38 0.24 0.80 0.91 
%OXHWDNHVRWKHUV¶LQWHUHVWVLQWR
account 1.66 1.60 1.33 1.22 0.78 1.32 0.85 
Blue would punish others unfairly* 1.75 1.31 1.24 0.62 0.51 1.09 0.88 
Blue generally follows standard 
norms of behavior 1.80 1.29 0.94 0.57 0.56 1.03 0.92 
%OXH¶VEHKDYLRUZDVDSSURSULDWH 6.19 4.70 4.51 3.06 2.77 4.24 2.14 
A person behaving like Blue would 
be a problem for the group* 5.28 4.32 3.95 2.85 2.71 3.82 2.13 
Would like to spend time with a 
person behaving like Blue 5.83 4.25 3.91 2.69 2.33 3.80 2.15 
Blue approval index 0.79 0.24 0.03 -0.45 -0.62 0.00 0.80 
*UHHQ¶VEHKDYLRUZDVDSSURSULDWH 6.23 5.51 5.55 4.91 5.88 5.62 1.49 
A person behaving like Green would 
be a problem for the group* 5.24 4.97 4.95 4.46 4.84 4.89 2.10 
Would like to spend time with a 
person behaving like Green 5.92 5.33 5.43 4.65 5.69 5.40 1.51 
3LQN¶VEHKDYLRUZDVDSSURSULDWH 6.21 5.49 5.62 4.76 5.88 5.59 1.50 
A person behaving like Pink would be 
a problem for the group* 5.38 4.88 4.98 4.32 4.86 4.88 2.11 
Would like to spend time with a 
person behaving like Pink 5.98 5.30 5.36 4.68 5.71 5.41 1.48 
Green-Pink approval index 0.33 -0.04 0.00 -0.42 0.12 0.00 0.72 
Note. Entries are mean values within each condition. The last two columns give the total 
mean and standard deviation. The scale is between 1 and 3 for the first five items, and 





Table 2. Mean values of approval indexes per condition in Study 2  
Measure NO CWP IWP CSP ISP Total St Dev 
Blue approval index 0.71 0.16 0.04 -0.37 -0.54 0.00 0.75 
Green-Pink approval index 0.51 -0.04 -0.02 -0.54 0.11 0.00 0.82 
Note. Entries are mean values within each condition. The last two columns give the total 




Table 3. Mean values per condition in Study 3  
Item NO CWP IWP CSP ISP Total St Dev 
%OXH¶VEHKDYLRUZDVDSSURSULDWH 5.51 5.58 5.35 4.79 4.78 5.20 1.60 
A person behaving like Blue would 
be a problem for the group* 5.89 5.16 4.99 4.39 4.16 4.92 1.85 
Would like to spend time with a 
person behaving like Blue 6.13 5.36 4.84 5.00 4.34 5.13 1.56 
Blue approval index 0.45 0.16 -0.03 -0.20 -0.38 0.00 0.74 
Green-Pink approval index 0.36 0.08 -0.08 -0.29 -0.08 0.00 0.71 
Note. Entries are mean values within each condition. The last two columns give the total 
mean and standard deviation. The scale is between 1 and 7 for all items (but not the indexes). 




Table 4. Mean values of Blue approval index per condition in Study 4  
NO-B IWP-B ISE-B ISE-un IV IVE Total St Dev 
0.35 -0.62 -0.33 0.20 0.08 0.17 0.00 0.74 
Note. Entries are mean values within each condition. The last two columns give the total 












Figure 1. The triangles at their respective corners, with the blue triangle moving back from 
collecting a circle from the center.  
 
